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I. INTRODUCTION
Constant technological development has introduced another player
in sports broadcasting: virtual advertising, a form of digital technology
that allows advertisers to insert computer-generated brand names, logos
or animated images into previously recorded television programs or
movies. In sporting events, the advertisements can even be inserted live
as the game is played, as seen in Superbowl XXXIV on January 31,
2000.1 This technology has been used since 1995, but has not experienced
a major breakthrough yet. Several Major League Baseball ("MLB")
teams have made use of virtual advertisements along the wall behind
home plate.' Beginning this 2000 season, the technology will be used in a
minimum of twenty Sunday Night baseball games.3 Some teams in the
National Basketball Association ("NBA") display virtual advertisements
on their billboards on the sideline, while many collegiate conferences
have already made use of virtual advertising in their regular season and
tournament broadcasts.4 The National Football League ("NFL"), how-
ever, has yet to approve the use of virtual advertisements during regular
season games.' The Formula One, with some of the world's largest sport-
1. The New Jersey based company Princeton Video Image, Inc., at http://
www.princetonvideoimage.com/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2000), globally and regionally inserted
advertisements for the past three Super Bowls, NFL pre-season and NFL Europe games,
MLB games, professional soccer matches, motor sports and thoroughbred horse races.
2. For example, the games of three MLB teams, the San Francisco Giants, Philadelphia
Phillies and San Diego Padres, included virtual advertisements last season. See Stuart Elliott,
Real or Virtual? You Call It, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 1, 1999, at C1.
3. The agreement with ESPN and Princeton Video Image, Inc., covers the use of virtual
advertising in more nationally televised baseball games than in any other previous season and
will begin with the first week of the baseball season. Press Release (Feb. 22, 2000), at http:/l
%vwv.corporate-ir.net/ireye/irsite.zhtml?ticker=PVII&script=410&layout=6&item id=75829
(last visited Mar. 15, 2000).
4. These conferences are the Mid Atlantic Athletic Conference, Atlantic 10, Big South,
Midwestern Collegiate, and others. Pete Dougherty, Virtual Reality Hits MAAC Telecasts,
TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), Mar. 5, 2000, at E6.
5. The NFL's exercised restraint is probably based on the lack of control over the virtual
images on the television screen because the advertisements could be eclipsed or overshad-
owed by virtual signs. Alan Snel, These are Ads for All Stadiums; Only Home Viewers See
'Virtual' Logos, SUN-SEN'nmL (Fort Lauderdale), Dec. 31, 1998, at 1D. However, the NFL
approved its use in high school and college broadcasts, as well as pre- or postseason profes-
sional games.
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ing events, has successfully employed the technology in the third season
for the international broadcast of races in countries where tobacco ad-
vertising is banned.6 With the establishment of European and World soc-
cer leagues, virtual advertisements open the advertising market for
national or even regional advertisers and do not limit the advertising
space to worldwide operating companies. However, in international soc-
cer it was not until recently that the Federation Internationale de Foot-
ball Association7 ("FIFA") approved regulations that allow the use of
virtual advertisements on any flat area in the stadium at any time, except
on the playing field during the play itself.8 Whereas in Latin America,
where virtual advertising - even on the playing field - experiences a
widespread acceptance for soccer telecasts, the several European soccer
leagues are still struggling to adopt a uniform standard. With the rising
popularity of the NFL in Europe, not to mention "NFL Europe," a simi-
lar development can be expected with regard to internationally broad-
casted football games, which is not limited to the Superbowl.
Although virtual advertising allows signs, billboards, and other types
of in-stadium and on-field advertisements to be inserted into the tele-
vised picture in virtually any empty space, the demand has been medio-
cre, mainly because of the high costs of insertion in the early days of the
technology. Another reason for the reserved acceptance is the lack of
judicial review. So far, broadcast stations have exercised a rule of self-
restriction about use and abuse of virtual advertising, absent an agree-
ment.9 In fact, most professional marketing contracts are silent on rules
on alteration by virtual advertising. There exists no explicit federal regu-
lation with regard to virtual advertising. Despite the liberal advertising
market in the United States, there are limits by virtue of common law.
6. Such as the races in EU member states England, France, Germany, and Belgium, but
not in Monte Carlo. Johnny Watterson, Sport and Tobacco Drifting Apart, IRISH TIMs, May
24, 1997, at 8.
7. This is the governing body for world league soccer.
8. On January 1, 2000, FIFA's "Regulations for the Use of Virtual Advertising" became
effective, available at http://hvwv.fifa2.com/fifa/handbook/Va/downloadsNirtualRegs e.txt
(last visited Mar. 15, 2000). The issue of these regulations is intended to ensure that virtual
advertising is applied reasonably and the integrity of football matches maintained. See also,
Reuters, Fifa Yellow-Cards Virtual Ads, WIRED NEws, Dec. 22, 1999, available at http:/wwv.
wvired.com/news/print/0,1294,33232,00.htnil (last visited Mar. 15, 2000).
9. Virtual placement has to be done "tastefully," Virtual Ads, Real Problems, ADVERTIS-
ING AGE, May 24, 1999, at 30; "responsibly," Bruce Horovitz, USA TODAY, Aug. 19, 1996, at
1B; "with taste and discretion," Patrick Allossery, Virtual Ads Make Their Global Debut:
Technology Draws Both Supporters and Detractors, FIN. PosT (Nat. Post), Oct. 8, 1999 at C3;
and "in a subtle way," Dougherty, supra note 4, at E6.
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First, conflicts arise when "real" advertisements are substituted by
virtual advertisements without the consent of the owner of the physical
location. This practice generates new forms of conflicts among adjacent
parties, such as sponsors, different advertisers, team owners, broadcast
stations, and the stadium owners.10 The question often boils down to
who owns the rights to place and sell those advertisements." Further-
more, any altering of the appearance of the broadcasted event, with re-
gard to the advertising, raises copyright issues under the existing
doctrine of commercial substitution or may even violate Sections 111,
119, and 122 of the Copyright Act, as amended by the Satellite Home
Viewer Improvement Act of 1999.12 Finally, such behavior could consti-
tute Unfair Competition under Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham
Act.' 3 Virtual advertising and product placement add a new level of
commercialism to television broadcasts by blurring the line between ad-
vertising and programming, ultimately exposing the consumer to an
ever-increasing stream of commercials. Whereas in Europe, a heated le-
gal discussion has evolved on these issues, the American marketplace,
with its liberal advertising policy, and the judiciary has not taken it into
significant consideration. However, in the long run these problems will
have to be faced.
The purpose of this analysis is to address these potential issues and
present solutions that incorporate the international - especially Euro-
pean - standards for the use of virtual advertising.
II. FEATURES OF VIRTUAL ADVERTISING
Virtual advertising is the use of high-power computers to place still
or video images into live video broadcasts in real time so that they look
10. This form of advertising strategy is referred to as "ambush-ad," see infra Part V.D.;
e.g. when CBS covered up a Times Square Advertisement on New Years Eve's broadcast with
a CBS logo. Ned Potter, Arbitrary Digital Advertising (Jan. 31, 2000), available at http://
more.abcnews.go.com/onair/closerlook/wntO00131_cldigitaladsfeature.html (last visited
Mar. 15, 2000); Paul Vercammen, Digital Developments: Networks Changing Images on Your
TV, available at http://vww.cnn.com/2000/SHOWBIZITV/01/ 25/digital.inserts/ (last visited
Mar. 15, 2000); Alex Kuczynski, On CBS News, Some of What You See Isn't There, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2000, at Al. In the sports context, this may not always be a problem, because
the teams control the sale of advertising space in the stadium and in the broadcast to both
kinds of advertisers. However, problems do arise, when different entities are involved.
11. Dean Bonham, 'Virtual Technology' Takes the Field- With an Ad-Itude, COMMERCIAL
APPEAL (Memphis, TN), Feb. 21, 1999, at Cl.
12. The Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act, §1948, 106th Cong. (1999), available at
http:lfrwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bingetdo.cgi?dbname=l6_cong-bills&docid = f:sl948is.
txt (last visited Mar. 15, 2000).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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as if they are part of the original scene. It works by tampering with the
digital broadcast signal before it reaches our homes. In more technical
terms, virtual advertising refers to the computer manipulation of authen-
tic images, either live or delayed, and the substitution of various ele-
ments of those images with the purpose of implementing advertising
messages into the signal transmitted by television or by similar current
or future technologies (on-line, desktop publishing, single frame,
DVD.).14 The technology is based on a patented adaptive occlusion pro-
cess, a sophisticated version of something similar to the blue-screen tech-
nology used in broadcast weather forecast maps. 5 Before the broadcast,
the cameras are set up at certain angles, so as to give the best impres-
sions of the game while allowing in-stadium advertisements to be ex-
posed to the viewer as well. In the virtual advertising system, a computer
instantly superimposes the advertisement when it recognizes a previ-
ously designated spot and adjusts it accordingly as the camera follows
the action. This technology allows advertisers to cover over existing ad-
vertising signage in a stadium and can even feature two- or three-dimen-
sional animations.' 6 Virtual advertising companies can disguise the video
advertisements as standing billboards, banners blowing in the wind, or
logos painted directly on the playing field. The advertisements also can
be combined with special effects, such as the pitch speed indicator and
game statistics. Players "occlude" the ad or logo so that they appear to
move in front of it. The technology does not only occur in sports tele-
casts, but also in entertainment programs and even movies.' 7
Television exposure is the advertisers' most important benefit of any
small advertisement, for which they sometimes pay millions of dollars
per season. The advantages of virtual advertising are evident.'" This
technology enhances the possibilities available to advertisers and raises
television advertising to a new level. It is possible to effectively reach
consumers through unique marketing strategies by adjusting virtual ad-
14. FIFA Regulations for the Use of Virtual Advertising § 2a, available at http:ll
wxvw.fifa2.com/fifa/handbook/Va/downloads/VirtualRegse.txt (last visited Mar. 15, 2000).
15. It originated in various military forces around the world to mark targets on computer-
ized maps. Peter Goddard, The New Ad Fad, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 12, 2000, at 1.
16. Princeton Video Image, Inc., at http://www.princetonvideoimage.comlservice/in-
dex.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2000).
17. CBS uses virtual advertising in entertainment programs, such as "CBS Evening
News," "48 Hours," and "The Early Show." Don Aucoin, TV & Radio; CBS Faulted for
Digital Inserts, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 13, 2000, at D12.
18. Theresa E. McEvilly, Virtual Advertising in Sports Venues and the Federal Lanham Act
§ 43 (a): Revolutionary Technology Creates Controversial Advertising Medium, 8 SETON HALL
J. SPORT L. 603, 606 (1998).
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vertisements to respective geographic markets, such as foreign markets.
Furthermore, adjusting the content of a televised event, with existing
bans on television advertising for alcohol and tobacco, renders the use of
advertisements more efficient for international broadcasts.' 9 The system
also allows previously unmarketed portions of the television screen to be
sold to advertisers who do not have to wait for breaks in the action to get
their image before the viewers. Virtual advertising contains elements of
individualized advertising in cyberspace, where the banner advertise-
ments are selected in accordance with information contained in a
"cookie" of the consumer's computer or to the search words that are
entered into a search engine as part of the content mix.2' In both scena-
rios, the user is subject to individualized commercials, which offer the
advertiser a more efficient means of reaching his target consumer mar-
ket. At the same time, it is a tool against "channel zapping," because the
viewer is exposed to advertisements during the sports coverage itself.
The advertiser is rewarded with a guaranteed audience, while the broad-
caster has a wonderful opportunity to increase revenues - provided the
advertiser and broadcaster first gain the permission of the program's
rights holder.2' The element of product placement is rendered more val-
uable. Some television executives even contend that the technology is a
means of reducing the amount of commercial breaks.
Virtual advertising may even make live attendance more attractive to
sport fans because the technology allows the playing field and surround-
ing areas to be cleared of advertisements while television viewers at
home are exposed to commercials. At the same time, however, team
owners lose control over their broadcasts. As much as they used to be
able to control the physical access of television teams to the stadium, the
outcome of the television transmission, the placement of advertising, and
their allocation during the broadcast, television transmissions are now
subject to digital alteration at any point in the chain of transmissions
throughout the country and even internationally. As much as the teams
19. Virtual advertisements enable the worldwide Formula One broadcasts, which heavily
depend on tobacco advertising, to continue and guarantee their future financial survival, even
after several countries enacted a ban on tobacco advertising. This affects, for example, all
races within the European Union. Watterson, supra note 6, at 8; Jimmy Bums, Virtual Adverts
Hit Harsh Reality, FiN. TiNEs, Apr. 25, 1997, at 14.
20. Dennis P. Wilkinson, Virtual Ads Make Sense, ADVERTISING AGE, June 14, 1999, at
36.
21. In Canada, broadcasters are restricted to 12 minutes of commercials every hour. Be-
cause the characterization of virtual advertising is unclear, regulators have yet to rule on vir-
tual advertising so it is not counted as part of that allotment. Chris Zelkovich, Virtual
Advertising, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 1, 1999, at 1.
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and leagues seek to control misuse by contractual terms in their license
and marketing agreements, the threat of alterations of the original
broadcasts remains, especially for secondary transmissions under the
compulsory license scheme.2' On the downside, there is also a potential
for a distracting application of the medium by inserting large animated
images or offensive product placement, for example, products flying
around the players during the action.-3
The costs of virtual advertisements are somewhat equivalent or rela-
tive to conventional advertising. For instance, in baseball a half-inning of
static virtual advertising is typically valued as equivalent to one thirty-
second spot in the same broadcast.24 However, the production costs of
the virtual advertisement have to be added. Because the advantages of
virtual advertising in light of the still high costs play out especially for
trans-border sports broadcasting, the necessity for clear legal standards
becomes crucial.
III. FEDERAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT (SECTIONS 501(A), 106-122
OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT)
Section 501(a) of the Copyright Act of 19762 provides that the copy-
right owner can recover damages from anyone who infringes on one of
the exclusive rights. Copyright infringement must be considered if the
unauthorized deletion or substitution of existing advertisements by in-
serting virtual advertisements infringes the copyright owners' exclusive
rights provided under sections 106-122 of the Copyright Act. Since the
subject matter is television broadcasting, copyright infringement should
be examined if the special provisions in sections 501(c)-(e), 111(c),
119(a)(5), and 122 of the Copyright Act on secondary transmissions are
applicable.
A. Sport Broadcasting and "Work of Authorship" (Section 102(a) of
the Copyright Act)
The Copyright Act protects only "original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression,"26 including "motion pictures and
22. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119, 122 (1999).
23. Jim Davies, Connected: Advertising Conjuring Ads Out of Thin Air Using Pinpoint
Technology Based on Military Tracking, Virtual Advertising Can Impose Images Tailored to
Particular Countries, Tweaking the Display to Complement the Market, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Dec. 11, 1999, at 6.
24. In Superbowl XXXIV a 30 second commercial cost $ 1.6 million.
25. Copyright Act § 501, 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1999).
26. Copyright Act § 102(a).
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other audiovisual works."'27 With regard to virtual advertising in sports
broadcasting, the first hurdle is to determine the rights in the broadcast
that could be subject to litigation and if the placement of virtual and
non-virtual advertisements in itself is part of the original expression of
the work of authorship. If not, any substitution, insertion or deletion
cannot constitute a violation of the rights provided in section 106 of the
Copyright Act.
First, the telecasts of a sporting event have to meet the requirement
of an "original work[s] of authorship."28 The requirement of originality
actually subsumes two separate conditions, that is, the work must possess
an independent origin and a minimal amount of creativity.2 9 Section
102(a) of the Copyright Act lists eight categories of "works of author-
ship" covered by the act, including such categories as "literary works,"
"musical works," and "dramatic works."3 The list does not include ath-
letic events and, although the list is concededly non-exclusive, such
events are neither similar nor analogous to any of the listed categories.3 '
Consequently, the underlying games of a sports telecast do not fall
within the subject matter of federal copyright protection because they do
not constitute "original works of authorship. ' 32 If it were, any team that
performs a unique combination or play could claim a copyright in it and
enjoin other teams from competing with the same plays or combinations;
after all, it would be impractical to include all participants - players,
fans, the league, stadium workers, etc. - as copyright holders.33
As for the telecasts' originality, courts have long recognized that
photographing a person or filming an event involves creative labor.3 4
But sporting events are not authored in any common sense of the word.
They do not rely on an underlying script;3 5 moreover, the thrill of a
sporting event is just the fact that there is no underlying predetermined
27. Copyright Act § 102(a)(6).
28. Copyright Act § 102(a).
29. See, e.g., Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F2d 486,490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
857 (1976); Withol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1956); see also, MELVILLE B. NIMMER
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON Copy rHT § 2.01 (1999).
30. Copyright Act § 102(a).
31. National Basketball Assoc. v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997).
32. Id.
33. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 29, § 2.09[F].
34. Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n., 805 F.2d 663, 668
(7th Cir. 1986); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884); Time Inc. v.
Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F.Supp. 130, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
35. Anne M. Wall, Sports Marketing and the Law: Protecting Proprietary Interests in
Sports Entertainment Events, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 77, 145 (1996).
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sequence of events.36 Even so, the elements of surprise, improvisation,
and wholly unanticipated occurrences create the attractiveness of a
sporting event. However, the creative element of the original work of
authorship that underlies a sporting event rests in unique selection of
sequences and the like. The many decisions that must be made during
the broadcast of a baseball game concerning camera angles, types of
shots, the use of instant replays and split screens, and shot selection simi-
larly supply the creativity required for the copyrightability of the tele-
casts. When a football game is being covered by four television cameras,
with a director guiding the activities of the cameramen and choosing
which of their electronic images are sent out to the public and in what
order, there is little doubt that what the cameramen and the director are
doing constitutes "authorship."37 These decisions by the director there-
fore create a work of authorship and hence a property right in the broad-
cast of the games, which reaches full copyright status at the moment of
transmission and simultaneous recording.38
Furthermore, the telecasts are audiovisual works, which under sec-
tion 102(a)(6) of the Copyright Act come within the subject matter of
copyright.39 Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines an "audiovisual
work" as a work that consists "of a series of related images which are
intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices
such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with ac-
companying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material ob-
jects, such as films or tapes, in which the [work is] embodied. °40 For
purposes of section 101, the statutory term "series" need not be inter-
preted to mean a rigid, predetermined sequence. 41 This is precisely what
a television broadcast of a sporting event consists of, in spite of its lack
of predetermination. The telecasts are, therefore, copyrightable works.
However, the copyright protection only extends to those components
of a work that are original to the author.42 Therefore, it does not extend
to the basic ideas or facts of the game, such as statistics and basic data, as
opposed to the described broadcast expression. Only the constituent cre-
36. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 846.
37. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 52 (1976). See also, National Ass'n of Broad. Stations v.
Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675 F.2d 367, 378 n.18 (D.C. 1982); Motorola, 105 F.3d at 847.
38. David E. Shipley, Three Strikes and They're Out at the Old Ball Game: Preemption of
Performers' Rights of Publicity Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 20 ARiz. ST. L.J. 369, 371,390
(1988); The elements of this "fixation" in the sport broadcasting context are discussed infra.
39. Copyright Act § 102(a)(6).
40. Copyright Act § 101.
41. WGN Cont'l Broad. Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 1982).
42. Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Servs., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991); Motorola,105 F.3d at 846.
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ative elements of a work of authorship constitute the original expression
of ideas that is protected by copyright.43 Notwithstanding, in the leading
case, Burrow-Giles Lithograpic Co. v. Sarony, the Supreme Court
granted copyright protection to a photograph because it exhibited suffi-
cient originality for the arrangement of the setting, the light and shade
and the selection of the camera, costume.' The protection extends to
the fact that the game and the particular televised selection of the action,
and not the inserted commercials and station breaks, constitute the work
of authorship.45
The question arises as to whether advertisements as part of the
broadcasted event are part of the "original expression of authorship" of
this broadcasting. Generally, the author of the specific advertisement is
the owner of its copyright, not the broadcast station.46 However, the
placement of the advertising and the specific capturing by camera could
be part of the original expression of the broadcast. 47 While the arrange-
ment of facts in an alphabetical order lacks the minimum amount of cre-
ativity or originality, the arrangement of the advertisements in the
background of a television recording requires more artistic elements.48
First, the involved entities have to make decisions about the number,
size and style of advertisements and include respective terms in the mar-
keting contracts. Because the viewer will only accept a certain amount of
tasteful advertisements in a television broadcast before he switches
channels, a producer then has to make a choice about the placement of
such advertising in the broadcast. Nonetheless, especially with the possi-
bility of inserting advertisements subsequently, the contribution of the
43. Feist Publ'ns, 499 U.S. at 348; see also, Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512,
513 ; NIMMER & NiMMER, supra note 29, § 2.08[B][1] ("a very modest quantum of originality
will suffice").
44. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 61 (granting protection for a picture of Oscar Wilde); fol-
lowed by Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (upholding a copyright
in a circus poster); Time, 293 F. Supp. at 142 (for the protection of a home movie film ["the
selection of the kind of camera, the kind of film, the kind of lens, the area in which the picture
were to be taken, the time they were taken, and the spot on which the camera would be
operated {constituted sufficient originality}]"). See also, NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 29,
§ 2.08[E][1][2].
45. National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 792 F.2d 726,732 (8th Cir. 1986).
46. The advertisement in itself is clearly copyrightable. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
29, § 2.08 [E][4].
47. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 1471,
1477 (l1th Cir. 1991) (finding the creative reportage of events, replete with moving images,
graphics, etc. to be copyrightable).
48. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Assoc. Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801
(D.C.Ga. 1985) (Arguments based on lack of originality failed to defeat validity of copyright
in telephone book infringed by defendant's solicitation of yellow pages advertising).
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original producer's selective interpretation is minimized. The intention
of how and where to place advertising certainly plays an important role.
However, it does not constitute an integral part of a television broadcast.
There is no other reason for the appearance of advertisements other
than the appearance itself, but it is also a contractual obligation for the
creator. Moreover, the intent rather undermines a non-creative element
of advertising and, therefore, weighs against copyrightability. Neverthe-
less, these criteria do not help for copyright analysis, because copyright
is not based on monetary or contractual considerations. A producer has
to make a creative choice about camera angles and the sequence of
images to be seen, even with regard to green walls, on which virtual ad-
vertising could be added later. The Seventh Circuit approached the issue
with respect to teletext by comparing it to subtitles on television: If sub-
titles were part of the performance intended to be seen, they should be
considered "related images" within the meaning of the statutory defini-
tion of an audiovisual work.49
After all, the placement of advertisements and their incorporation
into a television broadcast may not be an ingenuous thing to do, but it is
part of the viewer's overall artistic impression of the broadcast and
therefore should generally be considered copyrightable.
B. The Fixation Element and the Television Broadcast System
(Sections 111, 119, and 122 of the Copyright Act)
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act states that a work of authorship
needs to be fixed in a tangible medium of expression in order to obtain
statutory protection.50 The mere act of thinking or the underlying ideas
are not protected as long as they remain unfixed or intangible.5 1 As for
live broadcasts, such as the football games, the Copyright Act states that
a "work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted,
is 'fixed' if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its
transmission," and thereby explicitly includes sports broadcasts once
they are broadcast and simultaneously recorded.52 Under section 101 of
49. WGN, 693 F.2d at 626 ("[I]t is clear that United Video may not use it for that purpose
without WGN's permission, any more than if the publisher of a book leaves the inside covers
blank the book seller (or book wholesaler, to make the analogy more precise) may inscribe
the Lord's Prayer on them in order to broaden the book's appeal.") (citing National Bank of
Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F.Supp. 533, 543-44 (W.D.Tex. 1980)).
50. Copyright Act § 102(a).
51. Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 254 (N.Y. 1968).
52. At the urging of the sports leagues, Congress afforded copyright protection to live
sports programming by devising an appropriate definition of "fixation" in Copyright Act
§ 101. "The committee was persuaded that... the content of a live transmission should be
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the Copyright Act, the simultaneous recording of a transmission suffices
for the element of fixation in a tangible medium of expression. 3 To
"transmit" is defined as "to communicate... by any device or process
whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which
they are sent."54 This leads us into the complex regulation of primary
and secondary transmissions for television broadcasts, which is set forth
in sections 111, 119, and 122 of the Copyright Act.
Originally, these definitions of copyright in broadcasts were designed
for television stations and networks. After the introduction of cable tele-
vision, the Supreme Court rejected copyright protection for the original
broadcasts under the 1909 Copyright Act against retransmissions by
cable networks, because they did not "perform" within the meaning of
the statute.55 With rising sophistication of cable networks, Congress
eventually amended section 111(c)-(d) of the Copyright Act, which
granted cable networks a compulsory license to retransmit certain
broadcast signals.56 In return, a semiannual fee in the form of statutorily
prescribed royalties is collected and distributed by the Copyright Roy-
alty Tribunal to indemnify copyright owners of the sports broadcasts.57
The compulsory license program now covers retransmissions of distant
regarded as 'fixed' and should be accorded statutory protection if it is being recorded simulta-
neously with its transmission." H. REP. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976). "The bill seeks to resolve,
through the definition of 'fixation' in section 101, the status of live broadcasts- sports, news
coverage, live performances of music, etc.- that are reaching the public in unfixed form but
that are simultaneously being recorded." Id. at 52; see also, Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675
F.2d at 378 n.17-18; Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 668.
53. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 847.
54. Copyright Act § 101. Specifically, Copyright Act § 111(f) defines a primary transmis-
sion as:
a transmission made to the public by the transmitting facility whose signals are being
received and further transmitted by the secondary transmission service, regardless of
where or when the performance or display was first transmitted" [as opposed to a]
"secondary transmission," [which] is the further transmitting of a primary transmission
simultaneously with the primary transmission, or nonsimultaneously with the primary
transmission if by a "cable system" not located in whole or in part within the boundary
of the ... states.
55. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); see also, Capital Cities Cable, Inc.
v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 708 (1984) (a state ban on alcohol advertisement conflicts with the
requirements of a cable operator's obligation to refrain from deleting commercial advertising
under the compulsory license system).
56. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 89, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5659, 5704; NIMMER
&NIMMER, supra note 29, at § 8.18[B].
57. Copyright Act § 111(d)(2). The first suit over the compulsory license was Eastern
Microwave v. Doubleday Sports, 691 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1982); see also, PAUL C. WEILER &
GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND TH LAW 413 (2d ed. 1998).
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network programming for cable television services. After the Eleventh
Circuit ruled that a satellite carrier is like a cable system within the
meaning of section 111 of the Copyright Act and therefore subject to a
compulsory license for the retransmission of distant signals55 Congress
added section 119 of the Copyright Act for satellite carriers59. Addition-
ally, the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 extended the
compulsory license explicitly for satellite carriers to include retransmis-
sions of local broadcasts to rural areas in section 122 of the Copyright
Act.6" Nonetheless, the compulsory license in these cases applies only to
those carriers who exercise no "control over the selection of the primary
transmission," and "whose activities with respect to the secondary trans-
mission consist solely of providing wires, cables, or other communica-
tions channels for the use of others," turning the secondary transmitter
into merely a passive figure ("passive carrier exemption"). 61 Moreover,
any retransmission under either type of broadcasts must be without any
deletions or editing of any material, including commercials, contained in
the original programming. 62
This compulsory license scheme plays an important role with regard
to the advertising provided, since technology enables cable-network
providers to edit the program itself and alter the content of commercial
breaks. This was precisely the scenario in Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v.
Southern Satellite Systems, Inc., where WTBS made use of a new tech-
nology that could insert different advertising in the programming trans-
58. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. Satellite Broad. Networks, 940 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1991); Satellite
Broad. & Communications Assoc. v. Oman, 26 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1313 (BNA) (N.D. Ga. 1993),
rev'd, 17 F.3d 344 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 823 (1994).
59. Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, §§ 201-02.
60. Copyright Act § 122(a)(3) as amended by the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement
Act of 1999. The purpose of the Act is to promote competition among satellite and cable
industries in derogation of the exclusive property rights granted by the Copyright Act to copy-
right holders. Similar to sections 111 and 119 of the Copyright Act, section 122 requires strict
compliance with limitations, such as the prohibition to willfully alter the programming. 145
CONG. REc. H11769 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1999); see also, 145 CONG. REc. H11811 (daily ed. Nov.
9, 1999) (statement of Rep. Tauzin & Rep. Markey).
61. Copyright Act § 111(a)(3); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 29, §§ 8.18[E],
8.18[F], 12.04[B][3] (providing an overview on the compulsory license scheme).
62. See the general provisions of Copyright Act §§111(c)(3), (e)(1) for cable systems,
the specific prohibitions of Copyright Act § 119(a)(4) for satellite carriers and Copyright Act
§ 122(e) for satellite carriers in rural areas. Any secondary transmission that does not satisfy
all of the compulsory license requirements is an unlicensed and hence infringing transmission.
NiMMER & NIMMER, supra note 29, §§ 8.18[E][9]; 8.18[F][3][c]; Cablevision Co. v. Motion
Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc., 641 F.Supp. 1154, 1163 (D.C. 1986), stay denied, 836 F.2d 599, 616
(D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1235 (1988); see also, Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v.
Crown Publishers, Inc., 456 F.Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Hubbard Broad., Inc., v. Southern
Satellite Sys., Inc., 777 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1985) and discussion infra Part III.D.3.
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mitted to distant cable systems from that incorporated in the original
programming, for example substituting commercials and editing the
original broadcast. 63 The court's primary concern was whether the com-
pulsory license scheme covered the new technology of microwave links
and the attached opportunity to substitute commercials. 6' The court
found that Southern Satellite Systems did not exceed their compulsory
license by using the new technology and that the accompanying quality
improvement was consistent with the principle goal of the Copyright
Act; to make copyrighted work readily available to the public, while still
allowing the copyright owner to protect his or her interests as long as the
content remained original.65 Also, Hubbard failed to show that WTBS
had ever substituted commercials or even attempted to do so. 66 There-
fore, no infringement occurred.
This detailed legislation and the accompanying judicial authority on
retransmissions provides important information for construing the Copy-
right Act with regard to the alteration of virtual advertising even under a
non-compulsory license - which is the case in most sports broadcasting -
and will, therefore, have to be kept in mind. However, before turning to
the analysis of copyright violations in this context, it is necessary to iden-
tify the copyright owner in order to distinguish him from any potential
infringer.
C. Owner of the Copyright (Sections 201(a), (b) of the Copyright Act)
The threshold of any litigation for property rights is the determina-
tion of the ownership of the rights in question.67 Having determined that
there exists a copyright in a broadcast sporting event - and presumably
in the arrangement and capture of the advertisements as a part of the
overall work of authorship - the question now turns to who has the right
to place and sell the advertisements in connection with a sporting event?
The issue does not arise if the event, the television broadcast rights, and
the stadium signs' property rights are in one hand. A broadcast entity
that directs, produces and, therefore, creates a protectible work of au-
thorship is often required to transfer some or all of the copyrights in the
broadcast to the sports team or club as an initial condition of being au-
63. Hubbard, 777 F.2d at 397.
64. Id. at 399, 401.
65. Id. at 403-04.
66. Id. at 402.
67. Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
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thorized to broadcast the games.6" The underlying reason is that the
clubs have a legitimate property interest in their games, which they can
sell and license exclusively to broadcasting companies that in turn value
them as affording advertising mediums.69 However, the legal challenge
erupts if several different entities are involved and the contract terms do
not address the issue or are invalid.
According to section 201(a) of the Copyright Act, the copyright in a
work vests initially in the "author" of the work.7° In general, the author
is the person that created the work. However, in the case of "works
made for hire" under section 201(b) of the Copyright Act, the employer
or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the au-
thor and, therefore, the owner of the rights comprised in the copyright.7 '
Section 101(1) of the Copyright Act defines a work made for hire as a
"work prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment. '' 72
The parties may expressly agree that the employee shall be deemed to
own the copyright in all works produced in the employment relation-
ship. 3 Likewise, the parties may expressly agree that all works produced
by the employee during the period of the employment relationship shall
belong entirely to the employer.
In professional sports, if the teams are part of a league like the MLB,
the NFL, or the NBA, the ownership rights will be distributed according
to the terms of their agreements. The underlying authorization is based
on the collective bargaining agreement of the respective organization
with the members of the league, which serves as a basis for the internal
rules, such as the League's Constitution, the bylaws, and the Uniform
Player's Contract.74 Externally, the collective bargaining agreement
serves as a basis for the collective marketing and broadcasting agree-
ments with regard to these games. All major team sports include terms
in their collective bargaining agreements and the uniform players con-
tracts that grant any rights in the games to the club or the respective
68. Shipley, supra note 38, at 392; Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad., 24 F.Supp. 490
(W.D.Pa. 1938).
69. Pittsburgh Athletic Co., 24 F.Supp. at 492; Shipley, supra note 38, at 393.
70. Copyright Act § 201(a).
71. Id. § 201(b).
72. Id. § 101(1).
73. For the interpretation of a work for hire absent an agreement, see Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989); NIMMER & NIMMR, supra note 29,
§ 5.03[B].
74. The Uniform Player's Contract is the standard form contract between individual play-
ers and their respective clubs. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 671.
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league, turning it into a work made for hire.75 The NFL, for example, is
the owner of the copyrights of the games involved on behalf of its mem-
ber clubs and the clubs as to their games.76 Since television marketing
generates most of the revenue in football, baseball and basketball, the
agreements with local, national, and superstations are crucial. The NBA,
for example, deals with national television exposure; however, the reve-
nues generated therefrom are shared among the teams. In baseball, the
league ordinarily permits each team control over arrangement for local
telecasts in its home city under the Federal Communications "Syndi-
cated Exclusivity Rules," which allow the teams to keep the local reve-
nue. The Syndicated Exclusivity Rules also prohibit retransmissions of
local broadcasts in order to protect the local markets. The underlying
purpose of this distribution scheme is to protect the unique competition
in professional sports nationwide and maintain its attractiveness to the
viewer.77 Some doubts arose in 1980s baseball, when baseball players
challenged their contracts claiming to be the owners of the copyright in
the baseball games.78 The players contended that the baseball games
were performed outside the scope of their employment and, therefore,
would not be encompassed by the work for hire doctrine.7 9 Hence, play-
ers claimed that the baseball clubs did not own the exclusive rights to the
televised performances of the players during major league baseball
games. The court disagreed since the parties did not expressly agree to
this respect, as is required by section 201(b) of the Copyright Act. More-
over, the Uniform Players Contract provided the opposite.80 Profes-
sional baseball today allows almost unlimited broadcasting over
superstations, while claiming a portion of the revenues for distribution
among the clubs.8' Most in-game advertising is sold directly through the
networks, such as Turner Network Television ("TNT"), TBS or NBC. It
75. Pamela R. Lester, Marketing the Athlete: Endorsement Contracts, SD58 ALI-ABA
385, 390 (1999).
76. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 621 F.Supp at 885, affd, 792 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Such
game programs were duly registered in the United States Copyright office and those registra-
tions were valid and enforceable"). Id. at 885.
77. Franklin M. Fisher, et. al., The Economics of Sports Leagues - The Chicago Bulls
Case, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 8, 9 (1999).
78. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 666.
79. Id. at 667-68.
80. Id. at 679. (In rejecting the player's arguments, the court left it to the players to attain
their objective by bargaining with the Clubs for a contractual declaration that they own a joint
or an exclusive interest in the copyright of the telecasts).
81. Chicago Prof'1 Sports Ltd. P'ship & WGN v. National Basketball Ass'n, 754 F.Supp.
1336, 1339-1445 (N.D. I11. 1991); see also, WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 57, at 583 (contracts
provide the exclusive broadcasting of the games by ESPN or Fox).
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is not clear, however, whether the original copyrights in the telecasts of
the various games are owned separately by individual clubs or jointly by
some combination of clubs. It is also unclear whether the copyrights in
the telecasts are owned exclusively by the clubs or jointly by the clubs
and the television stations or networks that record and broadcast the
games.
These issues have been addressed for the NBA in Chicago Profes-
sional Sports Limited Partnership & WGN v. National Basketball Associ-
ation.' Although the NBA has transferred the exclusive rights to
broadcast most of the games to TNT, this did not limit the individual
clubs to broadcast other contests on local over-the-air broadcast stations.
Both the contracts and the league's articles and bylaws reserve to the
individual clubs the full copyright interest in all games that the league
has not sold to networks.83 The question then turns to whether the copy-
righted game broadcasts stem from a single source or rather a joint ven-
ture.84 One theory viewed the NBA as a single firm producing the
product "games," and a group of potential competitors selling them. 5
Following a series of decisions, Judge Easterbrook found that the NBA,
when acting in the broadcast market, was closer to a single firm than to a
group of independent firms, calling it a "single bargaining employer."' 86
Following his opinion, the NBA is best understood as one firm when
selling broadcast rights to a network in competition with a thousand
other producers of entertainment.87 Therefore, the NBA, as an agent
acting on behalf of the individual club when selling the broadcast rights
collectively, is closer to being considered the owner of the copyright by
virtue of the collective bargaining agreement than the individual club.
Otherwise, the league would not be in a position to sell these rights in
the first place.
With regard to secondary transmission, section 501(e) of the Copy-
right Act provides that a network station holding a copyright or other
license to transmit or perform the same version of that work shall be
treated as owner of the work.8 Therefore, in the established licensing
82. 754 F.Supp. 1336
83. Chicago Prof. Sports, 961 F.2d at 671, vacated and remanded, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir.
1996). Following this series of decisions the Chicago Bulls and TNT eventually settled their
dispute with an intermediary solution.
84. Chicago Prof Sports, 95 F.3d at 596; WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 57, at 583.
85. Chicago Professional Sports, 961 F.2d at 672; Fisher, et. al., supra note 77, at 5 (provid-
ing a sound description of the genuine 'product' in the sports context).
86. But only for antitrust purposes, see Chicago Prof. Sports, 95 F.3d at 598.
87. Id. at 600.
88. Copyright Act § 501(e).
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chain for sports broadcasting, any legal or beneficiary owner of such a
compulsory or contractual license shall be treated as the owner of the
copyright with standing to sue.
D. Copying of the Owner's Rights (Section 106 of the Copyright Act)
The Copyright Act does not give the copyright holder control over all
uses of a copyrighted work; instead, it enumerates several "rights" that
are made exclusive to the copyright holder.8 9 "Copying" is the shorthand
reference to the act of infringing on any of the copyright owner's five
exclusive rights set forth in section 106 et seq. of the Copyright Act.90
The infringing act by substituting advertising could constitute the prepa-
ration of a reproduction, a performance or the preparation of a deriva-
tive work. In the absence of one or more of these enumerated results,
the claim of violation of the copyright law by unlawful distribution of a
work is barred.91 Courts have been unclear in defining the specific in-
fringing action in television broadcasts, even calling it the "right to make
changes." 92 However, the underlying theory mostly points towards the
preparation of a derivative work under section 106(2) of the Copyright
Act.93
Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a "derivative work" as "a
work based upon one or more pre-existing works, such as a translation,
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture ver-
sion, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted."94 A derivative work consists of a contribution of original ma-
terial to a pre-existing work so as to recast, transform or adapt the pre-
existing work.95 It consists of editorial revisions, annotations, elabora-
tions, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original
89. Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 393-94 (1968); Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 710;
WGN Continental Broad. Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 1982).
90. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Video Broad. Sys., Inc., 724 F.Supp. 808, 819 (D.Kan.
1989); S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989). See also, NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 29, § 8.01[A].
91. Paramount, 724 F.Supp. at 821.
92. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 29, § 8D.04 [A][1] ("the license to reproduce and/or
perform is limited to reproduction and/or performance in the form in which the authors wrote
the work, so that a material departure from such form goes beyond the terms of the license,
and hence results in an infringement of the reproduction and/or performance rights"); Oddo v.
Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 634 (9th Cir. 1984). Another court called the infringement 'unauthorized
revision,' see Nat'l Bank, 503 F.Supp. at 544.
93. Copyright Act § 106 (2); Paramount, 724 F.Supp. at 819.
94. Copyright Act § 101.
95. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 29, § 3.03.
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work of authorship.16 The alteration of television signals with virtual ad-
vertising is such a modification of the television broadcast as a whole.
However, a work will be considered a derivative work only if the mate-
rial that it has derived from a pre-existing work had been taken without
the consent of a copyright proprietor of such pre-existing work.97 While
advertisement as a part of the sport-broadcast is an original work under
the described circumstances and the insertion of virtual advertising con-
stitutes the preparation of a derivative work, the television broadcasts
are made with the consent of the copyright owner by virtue of compul-
sory or non-compulsory licenses. The author can always grant the right
to make changes to the work. In sports broadcasts, the leagues' and the
clubs' agreements with the broadcast stations include detailed terms
about the right to insert commercials. But these assignments or licenses
are silent with respect to the right to make changes in the work by using
virtual advertisement, except for the explicit rights to use virtual adver-
tising in certain games' broadcasts, such as Superbowl XXXIV. Also, the
broadcast agreements do not encompass the statutory compulsory li-
cense scheme for any number of retransmissions. Finally, sections
111(c)(3), 119(a)(4), and 122(e) of the Copyright Act impose limitations
on alterations for retransmissions under the passive common carrier ex-
emption. These detailed rules also provide helpful hints for interpreting
the effect of alterations on the copyrights with respect to non-compul-
sory licenses by virtue of analogy absent an agreement.
By taking into consideration these elements in the context of sports
television broadcasts, it has to be determined if the unauthorized inser-
tion of virtual advertising meets the legislative and common law stan-
dards for "copying" under sections 106, 111, 119, and 122 of the
Copyright Act.
1. Legislative History of the Passive Carrier Exemptions
Section 111(c)(3) of the Copyright Act provides that a cable system is
fully subject to the remedies provided for copyright infringement if the
cable system willfully alters the original transmission through changes,
deletions, or additions.9 8 Included in this prohibition are commercial
messages and station announcements during the program, so as to en-
sure a continuous ban on the so-called "commercial substitution." 99 In
96. Copyright Act § 101.
97. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 29, § 3.01 n.10.
98. Copyright Act § 111(c)(3).
99. 122 CONG. REc. H10727- 8 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976).
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adopting section 111(c)(3) of the Copyright Act, Congress concluded
that to allow cable television systems to alter the primary transmission
by substituting commercials would significantly alter the basic nature of
the cable retransmission service and make its function similar to that of a
broadcast station and hence constitute copyright infringement. 10 Fur-
ther, the placement of substitute advertising in a program by a cable
system on a "local" signal harms the advertiser, and, in turn, the copy-
right owner, whose compensation for the work is directly related to the
size of the audience that the advertiser's message is calculated to reach.
On a "distant" signal, the placement of substitute advertising harms the
local broadcast station in the distant market, because the cable system is
then competing for local broadcasting dollars without having compara-
ble programming costs.' 0' Congress, in prohibiting commercial substitu-
tion by cable systems, primarily sought to ensure the competitive
compatibility of the cable system and the local broadcast station while
also protecting the copyright owner.0 2 Cable systems, when retransmit-
ting local signals, would retransmit exactly what was received, and in
doing so would neither undercut the local broadcast station's ability to
generate local advertising revenues nor jeopardize the ability of creators
of programming to receive a fair return for their product based upon the
size of the audience that the advertiser's message was calculated to
reach. 0 3 In other words, the status quo relationship between local
broadcast stations and copyright holders would be protected and facili-
tated.1 4 Cable or satellite retransmissions enlarge a television station's
audience and increase the value of station advertising. As the 1975 Con-
gressional Hearings pointed out, the impact of cable retransmissions is
vital to college sports, because they depend on the distribution of those
100. H. R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 91 (1976) ("The cutting out of advertising, the running in
of new commercials, or any other change in the signal relayed would subject the secondary
transmitter to full liability"); see also, NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 29, § 8.18[C][1][b].
101. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 93-94, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5708. Consequently,
Congress "attempted broadly to proscribe the availability of the compulsory license if a cable
system substitutes commercial messages." Id. at 94; Hubbard, 777 F.2d at 404.
102. Final Report on the Inquiry into Professional Sports, H.R. REP. No. 1786, at 115
(1977).
103. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 94, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5708.
104. H.R. REP. No. 1487, at 92 (1976) ("Further, the placement of substitute advertising
in a program by a cable system on a 'local' signal harms the advertiser and, in turn, the copy-
right owner, whose compensation for the work is directly related to the size of the audience
that the advertiser's message is calculated to reach").
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revenues, 10 5 inasmuch as professional sports rely on advertising
revenue.10
6
The underlying intent points to the protection of the copyright hold-
ers' exclusive rights in the work against alteration while still promoting
broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts, as pro-
vided in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.1°7 Since the issues
with regard to virtual advertising arise in large part from the use of tech-
nology perfected after the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, these
goals of the Copyright Act will have to be kept in mind. In such a situa-
tion, courts looked to the "common sense" of the statute, to its purpose,
and to the practical consequences of the suggested interpretations "for
what light each inquiry might shed."'08 As the Supreme Court stated:
"When technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous,
the Copyright Act must be construed in light of [its] basic purpose,
[which is to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.]' 1 0 9
2. Common Law
In applying these legislative standards, courts in the 1980s have been
remotely split on the question of "copying" under the theory of "com-
mercial substitution" in television broadcasts.
In the landmark case of Gilliam v. ABC Inc. the defendant bought
rights to three separate television programs produced by the British
Broadcasting Corporation."10 The plaintiffs-authors of the script for
these programs, known collectively as "Monty Python," held the copy-
right on the script and objected when the defendant edited the programs
105. Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1823 (1975) (tes-
timony of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights); see also, Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675
F.2d at 379 n.20. The NFL agreed with Fox on the exclusive rights in sports broadcasting for a
four-year package worth $1.66 billion. The NFL created a total revenue of $ 2.2 billion in
1998. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 57, at 585.
106. H.R. REP. No.1786, at 115 ("[Clable should be regulated in its own right and allowed
to grow, but this growth should not be based on its use of copyrighted material in a way which
would financially injure the copyright owner").
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also, Hubbard, 777 F.2d at 396; Capital Cities Cable, Inc.,
467 U.S. at 710; Eastern Microwave, Inc., 691 F.2d at 132 (2d Cir. 1982); Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
108. Hubbard, 777 F.2d at 399; Eastern Microwave, Inc., 691 F.2d at 127; New York State
Comm'n on Cable Television v. Fed. Communications Coim'n, 571 F.2d 95, 98 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978).
109. Hubbard, 777 F.2d at 399 (citing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
464 U.S. 417, 432-33 (1984); Twentieth Century Music Corp, 422 U.S. at 156).
110. 538 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1976).
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to such an extent that the script was materially altered by deletion, edit-
ing, and insertion of commercial breaks.'1 ' In view of the material
changes and the substantive editing of the original broadcast, the court
found that absent an express agreement as to what alterations could be
made to a television program, unauthorized changes in the work that are
so extensive as to impair the integrity of the original work constitute
copyright infringement. 112 Even though the defendant had a valid license
to prepare a derivative work, this permission to use the original work
"may not exceed the specific purpose for which permission was
granted."' 3 The rationale for this result lies in the need to allow the
proprietor of the underlying work to control the method of
exploitation.' 4
The first significant ruling involving only the unauthorized insertion
of advertising into an existing work was National Bank of Commerce v.
Shaklee Corp."5 This case involved a book with an original collection of
household hints, which was published by the defendant Shaklee." 6 In
the published version, Shaklee added a number of advertisements re-
lated to household items without the consent of the author." 7 The court
held that a licensee infringes a copyright by exceeding his license and
that an author should have control over the context and manner in which
his or her work is presented. 118 "[The] author has a right to protect the
integrity of his or her work and unauthorized changes in the work violate
the author's rights even when he has parted with the publishing
rights."" 9
In WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., a televi-
sion broadcasting company sought to enjoin a telecommunications com-
mon carrier from retransmitting its copyrighted television program into
the carrier's cable television system after stripping the vertical blanking
interval of teletext information.12 0 The original teletext portion was sub-
111. Id. at 17-18.
112. Id. at 22; Oddo, 743 F.2d at 634.
113. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 20.
114. Id. at 21.
115. 503 F.Supp. 533 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
116. National Bank, 503 F. Supp. at 536.
117. Id. at 538.
118. Id. at 543 (acknowledging the lack of authority, the court relied on Gilliam, 538 F.2d
14 (2d Cir. 1976)). However, it did not specify the type of copyright - moral right, the right to
prepare derivative work, etc.
119. National Bank, 503 F.Supp. at 543; Bonner v. Westbound Records, Inc., 364 N.E.2d
570, 575 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Chesler v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 352 N.Y.S.2d 552, 555 (1973).
120. 693 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982).
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sequently inserted into the program alternatively as an integral part of
the news program or on a different channel and contained additional
information for the viewer, such as ballgame scores or weather re-
ports. 121 The defendant did not retransmit this information along with
the original news, but instead substituted teletext supplied with other
sources. 22 As a general rule, the court found that a copyright licensee
who "makes an unauthorized use of the underlying work by publishing it
in a truncated version" is an infringerY23 Absent an agreement with the
copyright owner, the carrier may not even delete commercials. 124 Section
111(c)(3) of the Copyright Act requires that any cable system that wants
to retransmit a broadcast signal without negotiating with the broadcast
station or copyright owner must transmit intact any commercials it re-
ceives from that station.'l 5
The district court in Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Video Broadcasting
Systems, Inc. did not follow the prior rulings in WGN v. United Video
and National Bank v. Shaklee.'26 Here, the defendant had placed com-
mercials for local businesses at the beginning of the producer-plaintiff's
motion-picture videocassettes.' 27 The court focused on the elements of a
copyrightable work and found that - unlike the holding in WGN - the
additions of advertisements would not always constitute an infringe-
ment.12  The unauthorized use of the protected work in a manner
outside the scope of any of the copyright holder's exclusive rights, there-
fore, is not an infringement of the copyright.'29 The "related images"
that the court in WGN relied upon did not encompass the advertisement
at the beginning of rental videocassettes containing motion pictures.130
Those advertisements were insignificant and, in fact, did not alter the
motion picture in any way.' 3' This was not a case where the substance of
the protected work was significantly altered and its quality and integrity
compromised by a licensee or grantee that oversteps his authority.' 32
121. Id. at 623-24.
122. Id. at 624.
123. Id. at 625 (citing Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 20 ["any unauthorized editing of the underlying
work, if proven, would constitute an infringement of the copyright in that work similar to any
other use of a work that exceeded the license granted by the proprietor of the copyright"]).
124. Id. at 624.
125. WGN Cont. Broad., 693 F.2d at 624-25.
126. Paramount, 724 F.Supp. at 820.
127. Id. at 812.
128. Id. at 821.
129. Id. at 820; Twentieth Century Corp., 422 U.S. at 155.
130. Paramount, 724 F. Supp. at 820.
131. Id. at 820-21.
132. Id.
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
While defendant's advertisement was an original work, the court did not
"recognize the addition of it to a videocassette in any way recasting,
transforming, or adapting the motion picture."'33 The result is not a new
version of the copyrighted motion picture.13 4
3. Discussion
While courts have been inconsistent in defining the nature of the in-
fringed right of section 106 of the Copyright Act, the bottom line is that
the alteration of advertisement constitutes a copyright infringement, if
the changes are substantial. The scope of protection is even broader for
television broadcasts: Sections 111(c)(3), 119(a)(4), and 122(e) of the
Copyright Act proscribe any willful alteration of a licensed retransmis-
sion if such a license falls within the scope of the statutory compulsory
license scheme. Congress' intent indicates that this protection applies to
the content and the advertising. Sections 111, 119, and 122 of the Copy-
right Act and most of the above-mentioned decisions were based on the
compulsory license scheme. However, with regard to contractual licenses
that cover the entire market in sports broadcasting and absent any
agreement to the alterations of the original programming by using vir-
tual advertising, the detailed rules serve as precedent and help construe
the application of the Copyright Act to unauthorized virtual advertising.
Applying the language of section 111(c)(3) of the Copyright Act in the
detailed framework for compulsory licenses, Congress implicates that
absent an agreement, willful alterations of television broadcasts consti-
tute a copyright infringement. Clearly, the element of willfulness will
have to be imputed in the scenarios at hand. Even if the license agree-
ments contained a term on commercial substitution in general, the
changes made with virtual advertising will have to be construed in light
of this legislation and the precedents.
Congress intended to protect the author's monetary interest in a rea-
sonable return for the creation when section 111 of the Copyright Act
was amended.135 This interest explicitly involved advertising. As with all
statutory licenses, they have to be interpreted narrowly, because statu-
tory licenses are a derogation of the exclusive rights granted and in turn
the limitations have to be construed broadly.' 36 Congress was also aware
of future technological development. Having these interests in mind, vir-
133. Id. at 821.
134. Id.
135. 145 CONG. RIc. H11811, 11812 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1999) (statement of Rep. Coble).
136. 145 CONG. REc. H11769 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1999) (text of conference report).
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tual advertising opens new alleys for the unauthorized substitution and
deletion of existing advertising and thereby keeps the author from re-
ceiving a financial return for the work he created. In Midway Manufac-
turing Co. v. Artic International Inc., the court held that a speeded-up
video game that was created by a licensee with the circuit boards that
were supplied by the licensor was a derivative work based upon a copy-
righted video game. 37 The preparation of this altered version by the li-
censee therefore constituted an infringement of these copyrighted
works.' 38 The court reasoned that the speeded-up version is a "substan-
tially different product from the original game and generated more li-
cense revenue per game, which was deprived from the copyright owner
without his consent.' 39 This amounts to a free ride of the violator on
someone else's creation. Section 111 of the Copyright Act was created to
protect this interest. Even if the specific scenario in section 111 of the
Copyright Act does not apply to all transmitters, the underlying ideas
promote the copyright protection of advertising against virtual altera-
tions under section 106(2) of the Copyright Act.
Virtual advertising can be inserted into an existing television pro-
gram after the work is completed or it may be inserted into pre-desig-
nated spots, such as green walls, with the consent of the author. The
unauthorized rearrangement, inserting, combining, or cutting of ele-
ments in an existing program distorts the original work, using the unique
adaptive occlusion process.' 40 Those changes take away some of the
original expression from the work by altering the overall arrangement
and selection of advertising in the background of a sports performance.
A significant change in the scenery of a broadcast, such as a large adver-
tisement on or next to the football or baseball field, constitutes a copy-
ing, since the selection of camera angles, the placement and size of the
advertisements constitute original and creative elements. Even if the
changes are not significant, there may still be an infringement.' 4'
"It is obvious that the commercial success of live television sports
and entertainment depends substantially on advertising.' 1 42 Advertising
137. 704 F.2d 1009, 1014 (7th Cir. 1983).
138. Id. at 1013-14.
139. Id. at 1014.
140. See infra Part II.
141. Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927)
(Slight differences between picture, observable by close scrutiny, do not avoid infringement);
Raphael Winick, Intellectual Property, Defamation and the Digital Alteration of Visual Images,
21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTis 143, 155 (1997).
142. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 621 F.Supp. at 886, affd, 792 F.2d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 1986).
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is normally inserted at a network control point.143 "Any live show, in-
cluding football games, requires at least two satellite transmissions, one
with a clean feed of the show itself to the control point and the other of
the dirty feed including the show and commercials to broadcast sta-
tions."'14 4 The sole purpose for the clean feed broadcast is to transmit
this signal from satellite so that the network control point could receive
it and insert the economically vital commercials. 45 With the adaptive
occlusion processing, this clear differentiation is watered down to a point
where any broadcast station, transmitter, or retransmitter or any cable
network is in a position to alter the content, needless to say the commer-
cials of a television broadcast. Unlike the scenario in Hubbard, the satel-
lite carriers and cable network providers today are in a position to
exercise control over the content and the selection of the broadcast by
using virtual advertising. 146 The ultimate beneficiary of subsequent inser-
tion of virtual advertising is the broadcast station. The loser is the first
advertiser, who paid to have his advertisement placed - either physically,
or even by using virtual advertising in the first place - and the consumer,
who is exposed to an ever-increasing stream of commercials, now even
as part of the game. The original copyright owner also loses control over
his work and its distribution. 14 7 Copyright law seeks to prevent such a
scenario. The right for the exploitation of a copyrighted work rests in the
owner. Therefore, any subsequent alteration should be banned if it
harms the interest of the original owner or the public.148 Therefore, the
unauthorized deletion or substitution of existing advertisements in a tel-
evision broadcast by inserting virtual advertising can constitute copyright
infringement.
IV. VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Another cause of action against unauthorized virtual advertising in
sports telecasts could be the player's right of publicity, if the virtual ad-
vertisement appears in a distorting manner in the background of the
player's performance during the game. The right of publicity was created
143. Id., 621 F. Supp. at 886.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Hubbard, 777 F.2d at 402.
147. Winick, supra note 141, at 155.
148. After all, any state statute and/or common law is preempted by the Federal Copy-
right Act, if they are applicable. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 848.
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in the sports world by a number of cases involving celebrities. 14 9 The
right of publicity protects an individual's right to control the commercial
exploitation of his or her identity. The present statutory or common law
in over thirty states recognizes a right to control the commercial appro-
priation of an individual's name, likeness, and reputation. 5 ' Sport celeb-
rities were the most prominent figures in advertising of the 1990s. In due
course, a player's good reputation is likely to be the subject of advertis-
ers' messages. However, there are limits as to the free use of a celebrity's
image, even under an existing advertising agreement. For example, if a
player is exposed in front of beer commercials that catch the eye of the
viewer, he is automatically affiliated with this product. In O'Brien v.
Pabst Sales Co., the plaintiff, a famous football player, alleged invasion
of his right of privacy when his picture was placed next to the defen-
dant's beer advertisement.':5 The court denied his allegations under the
evidence presented, stating that he had lost his right of privacy by con-
senting to widespread publicity, and the advertising did not falsely indi-
cate that the player used, endorsed, or recommended the beer
advertised.'Y2 Nevertheless, New York statutory law acknowledges a
right of privacy as a personal and non-assignable right not to have his
feelings hurt by unauthorized publications, and the common law even
adds the protection for a famous person's right of publicity. 5 3 Other
states agreed that a right of publicity exists that grants personal control
over commercial display and exploitation of the personality and the ex-
ercise of a person's talents.' 54 The Supreme Court upheld such common
law and/or state legislation.' 55
149. See generally, Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson, 280 N.W.2d (1979); All v. Playgirl, 447 F.Supp.
723, (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F.Supp. 1277 (D.Minn. 1970).
150. David H. Bernstein, Current Developments in False Advertising and Right of Public-
ity, 1148 PLI/CoRP 133, 174 (Nov. 1999); Laura Lee Stapleton & Matt McMurphy, The Pro-
fessional Athlete's Right of Publicity, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 23 (1999); J. THOMAs McCARTHY,
McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETrrlON §§ 11:14, 28:1 (4th ed. 1999).
151. 124 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1941).
152. Id. at 170.
153. Halean Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953)
(Famous persons "would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements"). See also, Pirone v. Macmillan Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 585 (2d Cir. 1990).
154. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 376 N.E.2d 582 (1978), rev'd, 433 U.S. 562,
569 (1977) (holding that state law could award damages to an entertainer who attempted to
restrict the showing of his act to those who paid admission, when a television station broadcast
his entire act (a 15 second "Human Cannonball" stunt)); Housh v. Pety, 133 N.E.2d 340, 341
(1956).
155. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 579.
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In professional sports, the right of publicity is ordinarily transferred
to the clubs with regard to the players' appearances and their perform-
ances during the game. However, this does not affect the individual
player's right to exploit his or her personal image commercially outside
the playing field.'56 Today, players' associations exercise the group mar-
keting of certain publicity rights. The issue is whether certain virtual ad-
vertisements can violate the individual player's right of publicity under
state law in spite of and independent of these group-marketing agree-
ments. Within the NBA, no rules exist to prevent companies from sign-
ing NBA players to advertising contracts." 7 Players in all major sports
are free to enter into endorsement agreements in accordance with the
player's contracts that regularly provide the requirement of the written
consent of the club, which in turn shall not be withheld except in the
reasonable interests of the club or the sport.'58 Similarly, the FIFA seeks
to protect the integrity of the sport of soccer by a set of rules, parts of
which are the rules about virtual advertising. This legislation is embed-
ded into the European framework of keeping program and advertising
separate.159 Players and their performance should not be exploited by
businesses solely as objects of commercials by inserting virtual advertise-
ments during the player's performance. The line has to be drawn by the
governing authorities of the respective sport and - absent any rules - by
the judiciary. However, every player today is exposed to widespread
publicity, far excessive from the standard in O'Brien.6 ' The club and the
league largely control the publicity. With this in mind, it seems unlikely
that a court would not assume or imply the player's consent to the
advertisements.
After all, there exists no federal right of publicity. 6' Moreover, it
appears well settled that any potential individual player's publicity right
is preempted by section 301 of the Copyright Act with regard to the
rights in the broadcast.' 62 Any such claims would interfere with the uni-
156. However, most professional sports leagues prohibit their athletes from endorsements
of alcoholic beverages and tobacco products, see Lester, supra note 75, at 390, 393.
157. Robert N. Davis, Ambushing the Olympic Games, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENr. L.J. 423,
427 (1996).
158. Lester, supra note 75, at 390.
159. See infra Part VI.
160. O'Brien, 124 F. 2d at 170.
161. Bernstein, supra note 150, at 182.
162. Under Copyright Act § 301, a state law claim is preempted when: (i) the state law
claim seeks to vindicate "legal or equitable rights that are equivalent" to one of the bundle of
exclusive rights already protected by copyright law under Copyright Act § 301 -styled the
"general scope requirement;" and (ii) the particular work to which the state law claim is being
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formity of the copyright system and the exploitation of the works by the
author. 163 Although game broadcasts are copyrightable while the under-
lying games are not, the Copyright Act should not be read to distinguish
between the two when analyzing the preemption of a claim based on
copying or taking from the copyrightable work.164 Especially with regard
to virtual advertising, any player's right of publicity based on distorting
advertising would be essentially equivalent to the right to prepare deriv-
ative work, which falls under the Copyright Act.'65 Even if the copyright
claim allegedly does not encompass the uncopyrightable elements within
the work, it has been held that section 301 of the Copyright Act preemp-
tion bars state law claims even with respect to both copyrightable and
uncopyrightable elements.166 Moreover, the Uniform Players Contract in
all major team sports, in connection with the collective bargaining agree-
ment, explicitly states that the clubs and not the players own the rights to
the names,167 photographs or electronic images, including television pic-
tures. However, such rights may be assigned to the players associa-
tion. 68 In spite of the discrepancy in interpreting preemption, it is safe to
say that preemption applies, if a falsity claim is based upon state law and
merely alleges that defendant prepared a derivative work from the plain-
tiff's original work and sold it under defendant's name. 69
applied falls within the type of works protected by the Copyright Act under §§ 102, 103-
styled the "subject matter requirement." Motorola, 105 F.3d at 848; Baltimore Orioles, 805
F.2d 663 at 674; distinguished by, Brown v. Ames, No. 98-20736 2000 WL 48992, at *6 (5th Cir.
Feb. 7, 2000); in support of a right of publicity, Shipley, supra note 38, 384-88, 402; Shelley
Ross Saxer, Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Association: The Right of
Publicity in Game Performances and Federal Copyright Preemption, 36 UCLA L.Rnv. 861,870
(1989). The 9th Circuit rejected preemption in Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th
Cir. 1988).
163. Brown, 2000 WL 48992, at *'6; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boat, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 162 (1989) ("One of the fundamental purposes behind the... Copyright Clauses of
the Constitution was to promote national uniformity in the realm of intellectual property").
164. It has been argued, however, that even if one owns the copyright to a photograph or
other visual image, one does not necessarily also own the right to commercially exploit the
images of the persons appearing in that image; see Winick, supra note 141, at 179 (citing Bi-
Rite Enters., Inc. v. Bruce Miner Co., 757 F.2d 440, 446 (1st Cir. 1985)); National Bank, 503
F.Supp. at 540; RESTATEmENT (THRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETION § 46 Cmt. 1 (1995); MCCAR-
THY, supra note 150, §§ 11:14 [B], [C].
165. Ahn v. Midway Mfg. Co., 965 F.Supp. 1134, 1138 (N.D.Il. 1997). However, a copy-
right is not a license to engage in unfair competition; see World Championship Wrestling v.
Titan Sports, Inc., 46 F.Supp. 2d 118, 126 (D.Conn. 1999); see infra Part VI.
166. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 849.
167. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 675. In fact, the Major League Players Association
acts as the assignee of the individual publicity rights of all players; see Cardtoons, L.C. v.
Major League Players Assoc., 95 F.3d 959, 963 (10th Cir. 1996).
168. Lester, supra note 75, at 390-91.
169. McCARTHY, supra note 150, § 6:27.
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Taking into consideration these problems in pursuing a cause of ac-
tion under state law, it seems more appropriate under federal law to
apply a cause of action under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 170
V. FALSE ADVERTISING UNDER FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION
(SECTION 43(A)(1)(B) OF THE LANHAM ACT)
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act was amended, effective November
1989, to expressly prohibit, among other things, the use of any symbol or
device which is likely to deceive consumers as to the association, spon-
sorship, or approval of goods or services by another person. 17 1 Due to
the broad language of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the elements of
such a cause of action are remotely unclear.' 72 However, courts have
established certain groups of unfair behavior in the marketplace that fall
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The Ninth Circuit has read the
amended language to encompass the so-called "false endorsement"
claims.' 73 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act even allows competitors to
invoke a cause of action for unfair competition to prevent others from
marketing altered versions of copyrighted works. 74 Furthermore, sport-
ing events in particular are often faced with "ambush advertising," an-
other type of false advertising. Since the judicial analysis often left the
public with little guidance with regard to the specific elements of false
170. Copyright does not affect liability under the Lanham Act, see World Championship
Wrestling, 46 F.Supp. 2d at 126.
171. Lanham Act § 43(a) provides:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combina-
tion thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact,
or false or misleading representation of fact, which (A) is likely to cause confusion...
as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepre-
sents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
172. Jean Wegman Bums, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under the Lanham
Act, 79 B.U. L. REv. 807, 808 (1999).
173. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1107 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
1080 (1993); Katherine C. Spelman, Advertising and Promotions under Federal and California
Law 1999, 552 PLI/PAT 271 (1999). In Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391,
1401 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit held that the use of basketball star Kareem Abdul-
Jabbar's former name, Lew Alcindor, in a television commercial for automobiles aired during
a national men's basketball tournament raised an issue of fact as to whether consumers would
believe Jabbar endorsed defendants' products.
174. See, e.g., Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24.
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advertising, commentators have tried to narrow down and define the ele-
ments of the specific violations and establish groups of violations. 75 The
following analysis focuses on critical elements and emphasizes the most
suitable types of false advertising as applied to virtual advertising.
A. General Requirements
To establish a federal cause of action for false advertising under sec-
tion 43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act, the plaintiff must show either that the
allegedly infringing representation of fact is literally false, or that it is
likely to deceive or confuse consumers. 76 False advertising claims are
thus predicated on a statement or assertion that confuses customers. 7
Furthermore, "falsely suggesting the existence of affiliation with a well-
known business by usurping the latter's goodwill constitutes... unfair
competition.' 7  Specifically, to state a claim for false advertising under
the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendant has made a
false or misleading description or representation of fact; (2) in interstate
commerce; (3) in connection with goods or services; (4) in commercial
advertising and promotion; (5) when the description or representation
misrepresents the nature, qualities or geographic origin of the defen-
dant's or another person's goods, services or commercial activities; and
(6) that there is likelihood of injury to plaintiff in terms of declining
sales, loss of goodwill, etc.17 9
The traditional plaintiff under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act has
been a competitor injured in its line of business as a result of false adver-
tising.180 Hence, a cause of action could be available not only for the
175. McCARTHY, supra note 150, § 27:24; McEvilly, supra note 18, at 620-21; Wegman
Burns, supra note 205, at 864-67.
176. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 855 (citing Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 474 (2d Cir.
1995)).
177. Craig K. Weaver, Signposts to Oblivion? Meta-Tags Signal the Judiciary to Stop Com-
mercial Internet Regulation and Yield to the Electronic Marketplace, 22 SEATrLE U. L. REv.
667, 677 n.75 (1998).
178. ShowtimelThe Movie Channel v. Covered Bridge Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 693 F.Supp.
1080, 1089 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F.Supp. 1552, 1561 (M.D.Fla.
1993); Burger King v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1492 (11th Cir. 1983).
179. McCARTHY, supra note 150, § 27.24; Ditri v. Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates,
Inc., 954 F.2d 869, 872 (3d Cir. 1992).
180. Halicki v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 1987);
Waits, 978 F.2d at 1109. False advertising claims can be brought by corporations as well as
individuals, see Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,205
(2d Cir. 1979) (recognizing Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act claim where uniform worn by
star of X-rated movie was confusingly similar to plaintiffs' trademark uniforms, falsely creat-
ing impression that plaintiffs "sponsored or otherwise approved the use" of uniform).
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copyright owner or licensee of the broadcast, but also for advertisers of
in-stadium advertisements, such as billboards or other fixed advertise-
ments that are being subsequently substituted without the assignment of
any copyright claims by the owner of the broadcast. Even if it can be
assumed that the parties using virtual advertising compete for the most
effective television commercials, most courts have held that the parties
need not always be in direct competition for the plaintiff to have stand-
ing under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.'81 The Fifth Circuit stated: In
order for representations to constitute commercial advertising or promo-
tion they must be by a defendant who is in commercial competition with
plaintiff for the purpose of influencing consumers to buy defendant's
goods or services.' 82 If a party advertises, he is necessarily involved in
commercial activity. As soon as both parties use the same advertising
channel, they are necessarily competitors. Therefore, standing can be es-
tablished fairly easily.
A claim of false advertising may be asserted against "all those alleg-
edly responsible for falsely describing and placing in commerce the ad-
vertised goods."'8 3 This includes advertisers as well as contributory
infringers.'8 4 However, the media is generally not liable for acting as pas-
sive carriers for false advertising.85 But this exemption involves only in-
nocent communicators of otherwise misleading or false advertising. A
broadcasting company that willfully inserts virtual advertisements with-
out the consent of the involved parties is to be considered in violation of
the Lanham Act. Just like the limitation of the passive carrier exemption
for willful alterations, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is applicable if
the defendant did not act innocently. 18 6
Just like any advertising in sports, virtual advertising implicates a
statement of affiliation between the advertised product or service and
the object of sponsorship. It implicates the sponsorship or other type of
181. McCarthy, supra note 150, § 27:32, p.27-53 ("with the possible exception of the 9th
Circuit"); Waits, 978 F.2d at 1107, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1080 (1993); see also, McEvilly, supra
note 18, at 618-19; Wegman Burns, supra note 205, at 838-39; Bernstein, supra note 150, at
134.
182. Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 1384 (5th Cir. 1996). Using this lan-
guage reveals that it is in fact difficult to separate the elements of false advertising.
183. Grant Airmass Corp. v. Gaymar Indus., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
184. Bernstein, supra note 150, at 135.
185. Grant Airmass Corp, 645 F. Supp. at 1512; McCARTHY, supra note 150, §§ 27:52,
p.27-78; 27:70, p.27-105.
186. McCARTHY, supra note 150, § 27:83 (quoting 134 CONG. REc. H10420 (daily ed. Oct.
19, 1988) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier on S.1883)).
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affiliation between the subsequently inserted or substituted advertise-
ment and the teams, clubs, the respective league or the sport in general.
These representations typically occur in the context of "false endorse-
ment" and "ambush advertising."
B. False Endorsement
Falsity may be established by proving that the advertising is literally
false as a factual matter, or although the advertisement is literally true, it
is likely to deceive or confuse consumers or viewers as to the sponsor-
ship or affiliation of the goods or services.',' This scenario is often called
"false endorsement."'188 Although a virtual advertisement in itself cor-
rectly represents the nature and origin of the advertised goods, the fal-
sity has to be established in connection with the sponsorship and
affiliation of the advertisement to the sporting event. The error occurs in
the viewer's mind, when he or she unknowingly denies the right to public
credit for the sponsorship of the event to the original advertiser, while
affiliating the virtual advertiser's goodwill with the sponsorship.' 8 9 The
attractiveness of sports advertising is based on the popularity of the
teams and the players. No other television events attract greater audi-
ences than the major sporting events. In turn, advertisers are willing to
pay large sums of money for their appearance in such an event. Even
though there is no direct affiliation or proof of a product's quality in
such an advertisement, the public associates the large sums paid with the
good quality of a product. This behavior generates a company's goodwill
that is attached to its products. 90 The goodwill of a manufacturer is the
187. Lipton, 71 F.3d at 474.
188. Lanham Act § 43(a) prohibits the imitation of a person's distinctive attributes with-
out authorization where the imitation misrepresents, expressly or by implication, the person's
association with or endorsement of a product. See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1106 (establishing a
likelihood of consumer confusion that Waits endorsed Doritos); Allen v. Men's World Outlet,
Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (granting summary judgment on Woody Allen's
Lanham Act § 43(a) claim where ad featured photo of look-alike with clarinet and ad copy
evoking "schlemiel" persona, falsely representing that products were associated with him).
189. See also, Playboy Enter., Inc, 839 F.Supp. at 1562. The trademarks were obliterated
from the photographs, and then defendant Frena attempted to take credit for plaintiff's work
by placing its own advertising with the photographs. Thus, plaintiff has been denied the right
to public credit for the success and quality of its goods. Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356,
357 (5th Cir. 1990).
190. Jacob Laufer, Good Faith and Fair Dealing with the American Consumer, 1987
COLUM. Bus. L. Rnv. 167, 173-74 (1987); states that trademarks serve three basic purposes: 1)
to indicate origin; 2) to guarantee equal quality of all goods under that mark; and 3) as an
embodiment of goodwill - buyers will recognize high-quality products by its trademark and
the seller eventually will benefit from this recognition by increased sales. See also, William M.
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result of high-quality work combined with a strong effort in advertising,
which is all embodied in the affiliated trademark. The substitution or
deletion of an advertisement creates a false mental association in the
viewer's mind between the large expenditure on sponsorship and the
product. Furthermore, in-stadium advertisers have an interest in being
exposed over an entire season to achieve an ultimate and lasting mental
association for the viewer between the advertised product or service and
the sport broadcastings. This goodwill is wrongfully transferred to the
virtual advertiser resulting in a corresponding loss of goodwill for the
original advertiser. Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act was designed
to protect trademark owners and competitors from precisely this type of
free ride on a company's goodwill by false endorsement.
C. Copyrights and Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
Even though the Lanham Act is a trademark statute, it has been rec-
ognized that it applies to copyrights as well if they are used in connection
with any goods or services. 191 A violation of false advertising prohibi-
tions can arise in connection with the unauthorized use of copyrighted
materials in several ways. The unauthorized editing of a creative work in
connection with the original author's name can constitute a false repre-
sentation that this is the author's work when in fact it is a distorted ver-
sion of the author's talents. Also, the unauthorized reproduction or
distribution of a copyrighted work in connection with the true owner or
creator's name or mark can falsely imply that the copyright owner has
agreed to this use of its work.' 92 The situations before us involve an
overlap between copyright and protection by virtue of unfair competi-
tion; in addition to and independent of receiving copyright protection,
advertising matter may be protectible under false advertising law. The
scope and extent of protection of each area of law have to be distin-
guished accurately. 193
In Gilliam., the court held, notwithstanding the copyright infringe-
ment, that the editing by the defendant also misrepresented the origin of
the "Monty Python" show and therefore violated section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, stating that it:
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON.
265, 269 (1970).
191. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 26.
192. McCARTHY, supra note 150, §§ 6:27; 27:82; 27:83.
193. Id. § 6:30.
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impaired the integrity of appellants' work and represented to the
public as the product of appellants what was actually a mere cari-
cature of their talents.... To deform his work is to present [an
artist] to the public as the creator of a work not his own, and thus
makes him subject to criticism for work he has not done. Thus an
allegation that a defendant has presented to the public a "gar-
bled," distorted version of plaintiff's work seeks to redress the
very rights sought to be protected by the Lanham Act.194
The general rule that can be deprived from this landmark case is where a
copyright licensee acts outside the scope of the license to make unper-
mitted editing resulting in a distorted travesty of the original work, use
of the author's name is a false representation. In effect, a work not cre-
ated by the author is falsely attributed to the author. 195 However, where
the unauthorized alterations are relatively minor and inconsequential
and lack the kind of distortion found in the "Monty Python" case, there
will be no violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.196 For example,
in one such case, the court said that the issue is whether the edited ver-
sion "departed so substantially from the original work that [plaintiff]
may be said not to be its author." The court distinguished the "Monty
Python" case as one in which the unpermitted editing resulted in an "ed-
ited version [that] simply made no sense."
It is against this background that commentators have argued that the
colorization of a motion picture without the permission of the author
may be found to confuse consumers into believing that those creators
approved of or created the altered version.' 97 Courts have acknowledged
that substantial alterations may violate unfair competition laws.' 98 None-
theless, similar to the copyright analysis, minor changes would not lead
consumers to confuse products or their affiliation with a certain source.
The changes need to be material in order to deceive consumers. 99 Oth-
erwise, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act would be construed as a general
moral rights statute, which does not enjoy federal protection."' 0 In addi-
tion, a broad interpretation of the unfair competition cause of action
194. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24-5; Winick, supra note 141, at 172, 174.
195. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24-5; MCARTHY, supra note 150, § 27:83.
196. McCARTHY, supra note 150, § 27:83; Choe v. Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, 920 F.
Supp. 44, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Considine v. Penguin, U.S.A., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
197. Winick, supra note 141, at 174 n.143.
198. Under the doctrine of false designation of origin, see Stevens v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 148
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 755,757 (Cal. 1966); Schatt v. Curtis Mgmt. Group, Inc., 764 F.Supp. 902,913
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
199. Paramount, 724 F.Supp. at 821; Winick, supra note 141, at 175-76.
200. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 26; McCARTHY, supra note 150, § 27.0812][c][iii], [2][d].
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would undermine the standards that Congress intended to set with the
Copyright Act. The unfair competition claim merely gives competitors
other than the copyright owner or licensee legal standing. It would un-
dermine the copyright owner's rights in the work and its monopoly to
market and exploit the works, if a competitor with some financial inter-
est at stake is allowed to pursue these interests. Such a result causes an
unacceptable tension between competitor's rights and the rights of the
copyright holder.2° '
D. Ambush Advertising
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act can be triggered in cases of "am-
bush advertising." Although section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is prima-
rily designed to protect consumers from confusion, it is well established
that it also protects commercial interests of competitors. 02 Consumer
confusion, however, is not the primary concern in ambush marketing
cases; the courts ultimately seek to protect legitimate business interests
and sponsorship agreements. Much similar to the false endorsement cat-
egory, ambush advertising is a type of marketing by a company that is
not an official sponsor of an event, but which centers its advertising cam-
paign around the event to induce customers to pay attention to the ad-
vertisement and appears to be one of the official sponsors.20 3 The
advertisement may only remind customers of the event, or it may go
further to create the misleading impression that the company is an offi-
cial sponsor regarding these goods or services or is affiliated with the
event. In any event, a misleading impression is created that may lead the
public to believe that the owner of the advertisement sponsored or oth-
erwise approved the use of the advertisement.20 4 Through advertising
and promotional campaigns, the ambushing company tries to confuse
consumers and to misrepresent the official sponsorship of the event. In a
broader sense, rather than such direct and intentional misrepresentation,
ambush marketing refers to a company's attempt "to capitalize on the
goodwill, reputation and popularity of a particular sport or sporting
event by creating an association without the authorization or consent of
201. Winick, supra note 141, at 176.
202. McCARTHY, supra note 150, § 27:25, p.27-40; see also, S. REP. No. 100-515, at 4
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5580.
203. Davis, supra note 157, at 430; McCARTHY, supra note 150, § 27:66, p. 27-100.
204. Mastercard Int'l, Inc. v. Sprint Communications Co., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1963,
1966 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (following Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 205).
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the necessary parties. ' 2°5 Another type of ambush advertising may arise
when a company, which has a valid license from the event sponsor for a
defined market, uses the event to also promote goods or services outside
of its defined market. This, in effect, impinges on the rights of another
company who has exclusive rights in the invaded market.20 6 This scena-
rio applies to professional sports in a unique manner: All of the major
sports leagues prohibit non-sponsors from using league logos, official
team uniforms, hats and insignia in advertisements, but nothing prohibits
them from sponsoring individual teams. In an event where the market is
invaded by another non-exclusive sponsor, the company whose market
has been invaded may have standing to sue for false advertising." 7
Virtual advertising opens a whole new field of possibilities for these
types of ambush advertising.0 8 Virtual advertisements appear in the
background of the broadcast of the sporting event. They implicate that
the copyright owner of the game, the clubs and/or the owner of the origi-
nal advertisement approved the advertised products for just that loca-
tion. If this is not the case, the advertisements create the misleading
impression that the virtual advertiser invested large sums in sponsoring
the sporting event, which the category of ambush advertising under sec-
tion 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act seeks to prevent. In due course, the
virtual advertiser capitalizes on the reputation and goodwill of the sport-
ing event and gains a free-ride on the goodwill of the exclusive or official
sponsors.20 9 The sponsors spend enormous amounts of money to be
called the exclusive sponsor of major sporting events.210 "By diluting the
value of the corporate sponsorship, ambush marketing ultimately jeopar-
205. Lori L. Bean, Ambush Marketing: Sports Sponsorship Confision and the Lanham
Act, 75 B.U. L. REv. 1099, 1100 (1995).
206. See limitations for official sponsorship in Nat'l Hockey League v. Pepsi-Cola Ca-
nada, Ltd., 92 D.L.R. 4th 349, 369 (Brit. Columbia Sup.Ct. June 2, 1992).
207. McCARTHY, supra note 150, § 27:66; Mastercard Int'l, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1965-66.
208. Goddard, supra note 15, at 1 (comparing the situation with ambush advertisements
in Mastercard Int'l, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1966; John A. Nagy, Today's Column Brought to Us By
(Your Ad Here), GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., July 28, 1997; Wayne Walley, SciDel's Virtual
Ads Stay Underfoot, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Nov. 27, 1995, at A2 (acknowledging the possibility
of ambush advertising). Advertisers argue that because teams control the sale of space to
both kinds of advertisers, "that doesn't happen," see William Power, Signs of the Times; Virtual
Promotions Give Sports Advertisers a State-of-the-Art Advantage, FORT WORTH STAR-TELE-
GRAM, Aug. 2, 1998, at B4 ; the fact is, however, that virtual advertising enables third parties
to alter and therefore control the broadcast signal, allowing ambush advertising; see Snel,
supra note 5, at 1D.
209. Bean, supra note 205, at 1100; Davis, supra note 157, at 430; Wall, supra note 35, at
144.
210. Davis, supra notel25, at 424.
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dizes the financial vitality of sporting events."21' "One popular indirect
ambush technique involves buying commercial time prior to and during
event broadcasts." '212 Virtual advertising goes beyond that by not only
lessening the quality of the original advertising or the sporting event it-
self, but also by lessening the value of the advertisements during com-
mercial breaks. These advertisers may seek to prevent virtual advertisers
from diluting the distinction between program and commercial breaks,
which may eventually generate the impression of an advertising channel.
Finally, if consumers are exposed to virtual advertising, this does not
necessarily mean that there are fewer commercials. In turn, sports
broadcasting is abused for commercial exploitation.21 3 Even though vir-
tual advertising does not always depict the typical scenario, in which an
advertiser seeks to create a mental association between the consumer
and the non-existing sponsorship by advertising in addition to the ex-
isting sponsorship advertisements, the scenario resembles ambushing in
an obtrusive manner. Not only can virtual advertisements be added to
the broadcast without the knowledge of the involved parties, for exam-
ple, other advertisers, virtual advertisers are also enabled to delete, or
even substitute the existing banners. Such anticompetitive behavior
should therefore be banned as well.
"Still, because the traditional consumer protection approach to sec-
tion 43(a) [Lanham Act] is irrelevant to sponsorship and licensing con-
tracts and because ambush marketing claims are relatively new, courts
have yet to establish an appropriate analysis to deal with the protection
of sponsorship agreements. '' 21 4 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act consti-
tutes an appropriate and useful basis to fill the gap between contract law
and copyright law in order to protect third party advertisers. After all,
official sponsors and licensees who spend millions of dollars to affiliate
themselves with an event and a trademark surely will not hesitate to en-
force their exclusive rights.
211. Bean, supra note 205, at 1100-01.
212. Id. at 1103. In order to counter Visa's advertisement of its wide acceptance at the
Olympics, American Express bought substantial advertising time on major networks. Id.
213. Jim Abbott, A Different Playing Field, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 26, 1998, at D1.
214. Bean, supra note 205, at 1129.
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E. Impact of Consumer Protection
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act was designed to protect consumers
as well as commercial interests from the effect of false advertising.
215
One dangerous element of virtual advertising is that it is part of a trend
in which the advertiser shapes the entertainment and information con-
tent of this society.216 The consumers' perception of reality in the shape
of a live or recorded television broadcast is ultimately diluted, distorted,
and cluttered. Consumers are "blanketed in a continuous fog of spon-
sored pitches. '218 The development begins to highlight the possibility to
touch content and change it.219 To prevent this blurring of reality by en-
gendering virtual images, the viewer could be informed of the existence
of virtual advertisements. Early on, some teams and broadcasting com-
panies ran disclaimers in their broadcasts to disclose that some advertise-
ments viewers would see were virtual substitutes or inserts. But this
practice has stopped. 2 The average consumer in today's age of digitali-
zation may even be well aware of the fact that he is constantly exposed
to advertising and hence does not need such a disclaimer. On the con-
trary, virtual advertisement puts television on better competitive footing
with the Internet, where viewers readily accept promotional messages as
part of the content mix. 22 However, the intrusion of the television
viewer's privacy deserves even more protection, because by virtue of a
remote control he is not capable of choosing the setup of his television
screen, like he is when surfing the World Wide Web.
The issue is if this topic is merely a question of morality or ethics222
or if the law should step in, as it does in Europe for certain situations.22
Even in the liberal American advertising market, this technology can
push commercialism just over the line, leading to a William Gibson or
215. Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers, Co., 661 F.2d 272, 277-78 (2d Cir. 1981); Coca-
Cola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 822 F.2d 28, 31 (6th Cir. 1987); see Wegman Bums, supra
note 205, at 833-34.
216. Paul Farhi, Finding Versatility in the 'Virtual Ad'; Sports Broadcast Stations, Advertis-
ers Warm Up to Billboards That Aren't Really There, WASH. PosT, Aug. 18, 1998, at Cl.
217. Virtual Advertising Comes up Roses For Sponsors Bowl Viewers to See Logos Not
Really There, FLA. TimEs-UNIoN, Jan. 1, 1999; Digital Deception; TV Can Insert Ads Into
Programs After They're Filmed, FRESNO BEE, Apr. 1, 1999, at B6.
218. Elliott, supra note 2, at Cl.
219. McEvilly, supra note 18, at 611.
220. Power, supra note 208, at B4; see also, James Hattori, et al., Computer Technology:
That's Entertainment, 2000, available at http://www.cnn.com/1999/SHOWBIZ/Movies/12/31/
entertainment.future/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2000).
221. Wilkinson, supra note 20, at 36.
222. Goddard, supra note 15, at 1.
223. See infra Part VI.
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George Orwell-like alteration of reality.224 For sports fans it could even
affect the sanctity and credibility of the sport to have commercials
spread out along the sidelines, the walls, the air, or even on the playing
field.225 Virtual advertising generates more airtime for sponsors, squeez-
ing more money out for the network?2 6 Retransmissions of sporting
events generate even more revenue, whereas it also harms sports per-
formers, because they are degraded to objects of commercialism.22 7 This
scenario becomes even worse for the viewer and more offensive for the
performers in cases where the virtual advertisement is animated. Such a
use creates an annoying and distorting background to the action on the
playing field. 28 The courts will have to ask themselves if the consumer
will ultimately accept a television environment in which reality cannot be
distinguished from virtuality, content cannot be separated from advertis-
ing and advertising is ultimately encroached into athletics.2 29 As it
seems, television landscape has done so. The line is drawn, where a com-
petitor is involved and financial interests are at stake. The line is crossed
in cases where the virtual advertiser substantially alters, adds, or deletes
existing advertising, thereby causing harm to the competitor.
VI. VIRTUAL ADVERTISING IN EUROPE
Virtual advertising is not codified in most of the fifteen member
states of the European Union. No regulations were incorporated into the
1997 Television Without Frontiers Directive that regulates the television
broadcasting activities among the member states?230 However, the per-
manent council of the European Council for trans-national television
224. David Williams, See You at The Virtual Ballpark, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis,
TN), Apr. 13, 1999; William Gibson, Neuromancer, 1984, at *51 ("Cyberspace. A consensual
hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators . .
225. Zelkovich, supra note 21, at 1.
226. Dan Caesar, Hidden Ads are Adding up to Poor Sports, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Feb. 28,2000, at C5 ("...toying with reality for a profit motive is a device that should be left to
the movies and the video games, not something that is being presented as a legitimate live
event. A question arises: What's next?").
227. Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1823 (1975), at
817-825 (testimony of John 0. Coppedge on behalf of NCAA).
228. Dougherty, supra note 4, at E6.
229. Denise Gellene, The Cutting Edge; The New Age Ad; 'Virtual Billboards' May be a
Boom for Businesses, But Will Viewers Take to Them?, L.A. TiMEs, Sept. 16, 1996, at D1.
230. Council Directive 89/552/EEC, as amended by Directive 97/36/EEC, art. 10, 11, 13,
1997 O.J. (L 202) 60 et seq. ("[Directive on the] coordination of certain provisions laid down
by law, regulation or administrative action in member states concerning the pursuit of televi-
sion broadcasting activities").
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recommended that the exclusively responsible broadcast station should
retain the ultimate control over the content of a transmission. They
should ensure the compliance with articles 7, 10 and 11 of the Conven-
tion. These provisions prohibit the certain uses of advertising, such as
surreptitious advertising or the use of subliminal techniques.131 It also
prohibits advertising during the program as opposed to the designated
commercial breaks. 32 The permanent council, therefore, recommends
that the presence of virtual advertising messages during the broadcast of
sporting events should be indicated to the viewers at the beginning and
the end of the program. Furthermore, in no case should virtual advertis-
ing messages transform the perception or the understanding of the
event, or be detrimental to its visibility.23
The Television Directive is valid law in all member states of the Eu-
ropean Union. Most countries incorporated the provisions verbatim into
national statutory law. Some countries even added special provisions for
virtual advertising. The new German Broadcast Treaty among its 16
states, which will be effective in April 2000, generally allows virtual ad-
vertising to replace existing advertisements at the venue in sport broad-
castings, provided its presence is indicated to the viewer at the beginning
231. Id.
232. The Directive includes the following terms for television advertising:
Article 7
member states shall ensure that broadcast stations under their jurisdiction do not
broadcast cinematographic works outside periods agreed with the rights holders.
Article 10
Television advertising and teleshopping shall be readily recognizable as such and kept
quite separate from other parts of the programme service by optical and/or acoustic
means. Isolated advertising and teleshopping spots shall remain the exception. Adver-
tising and teleshopping shall not use subliminal techniques. Surreptitious advertising
and teleshopping shall be prohibited.
Article 11
1. Advertising and teleshopping spots shall be inserted between programmes. Pro-
vided the conditions set out in paragraphs 2 to 5 are fulfilled, advertising and teleshop-
ping spots may also be inserted during programmes in such a way that the integrity and
value of the programme, taking into account natural breaks in and the duration and
nature of the programme, and the rights of the rights holders are not prejudiced.
2. In programmes consisting of autonomous parts, or in sports programmes and simi-
larly structured events and performances containing intervals, advertising and teleshop-
ping spots shall only be inserted between the parts or in the intervals....
Article 13
All forms of television advertising and teleshopping for cigarettes and other tobacco
products shall be prohibited.
233. Recommendation by the Permanent Committee of the European Council for Televi-
sion Without Frontiers, 12th Session, March 1997.
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and the end of the respective program. The United Kingdom permits the
use of electronic imaging systems under similar prerequisites." 4 In addi-
tion, the United Kingdom provisions prohibit virtual advertising if the
use results in a discernible degradation of picture quality and restricts
the licensee's right to insert virtual advertising while providing him with
a right to refuse to carry virtual advertising. Spain goes even further by
requiring the consent of all parties involved for the substitution of ex-
isting advertisements through virtual advertising.
The Netherlands, Italy, France, Greece and Denmark did not adopt
any legislation on virtual advertisement. Therefore, the respective statu-
tory or common law rules on telecommunication, competition, and ad-
vertising are applicable. While the directive requires these countries to
adopt the minimum standard as it is set forth in articles 7, 10, 11 et seq.,
the interpretation of the existing law eventually exceeds these standards.
This has to be kept in mind for any sports broadcast to and from these
countries.35
In general, the European countries take a more restrictive approach
towards virtual advertising, yet they realize its advantages. Whereas, for
the European Soccer community it is a useful means to render the use of
existing advertisements more efficient, the Latin American countries ex-
ercise a much more liberal approach. Consequently, the FIFA has
adopted fairly restrictive regulations for the broadcasts of its members'
games3 6 Notwithstanding, the use of virtual advertising is crucial for the
survival of the Formula One in Europe in light of the ban on tobacco
advertising.237 However, the limitations are fairly strict; generally, only
physically existing advertisements can be replaced by virtual advertise-
234. Code of Programme Sponsorship, which is published by the Independent Television
Commission (ITC). Rule 13.5 of this Code requires compliance with the ITC Sponsorship
Guidance Note on "Virtual Advertising."
235. Norway, as a non-member of the EU, also has no specific regulation on virtual ad-
vertising. For television advertising during sporting events in general, it adopted an even
more restrictive approach under the 1992 Broadcasting Act by allowing advertising in sports
broadcasts only in 'natural breaks' or the designated breaks, such as half-times. Virtual adver-
tising may well be not allowed at all. However, this restriction only applies to Norwegian
broadcast stations and broadcasts in Norway only, since Norway is not a member of the EU.
The broadcast is also targeted at EU member states would lead to the application of the
above-mentioned rules.
236. FIFA Regulations for the Use of Virtual Advertising § 6, available at http://www.
fifa2.comfifahandbooklVa/downloads/VirtualRegse.txt (last visited Mar. 15, 2000); How-
ever, it is not necessary to point out the existence of virtual advertising to the viewers.
237. Article 13 Television Without Frontiers Directive (1999), available at http://
vw.nomos.de/nomos/zeitschr/zumlpdf/zum1099t.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2000).; However,
Formula One was able to negotiate an extension until 2006 for the ban to come into full effect,
because it depended on tobacco advertising more than any other industry.
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ments. Under no circumstances is a broadcast station entitled to insert or
substitute virtual advertisements without the consent of the rights hold-
ers." 8 The underlying object for these restrictions is the principle of sep-
aration between program and advertising, which furnished the heated
legal discussion. 39 After all, the present standard for the use of virtual
advertising in Europe is still far from being uniform.
VII. CONCLUSION
The complex legal problems that arise out of the unauthorized use of
virtual advertising could ideally be avoided by including explicit terms in
the marketing agreements between the leagues, the individual clubs, the
owners of the venue, sports marketing and broadcasting companies and
advertisers. Such terms should proscribe the insertion, substitution, and/
or deletion of existing virtual and non-virtual advertisements without the
consent of the parties involved. Under the compulsory license program,
an explicit agreement on advertising is replaced by the specific rules of
sections 111(c)(3), 119(a)(4), and 122(e) of the Copyright Act, which
prohibit any unauthorized, willful alteration of the content and the com-
mercial advertising of the original transmission. Even though these pro-
visions do not explicitly include virtual advertising, the legislative intent
and the history indicate their application. If no agreement exists and sec-
tions 111, 119, and 122 of the Copyright Act do not apply, common law
offers a promising remedy.
Having in mind the specific rules for the alteration of secondary
transmissions, sections 501, 106(2), and 201(a)(6) of the Copyright Act
are applicable concurrently. Although the placement of advertisements,
the unique selection of camera angles, lighting, and other decisions by
the director of a sports broadcast do not require substantial amounts of
creativity or originality, they do meet the minimum standards of creativ-
ity required to constitute an audiovisual work of authorship. For this rea-
son, anyone who materially alters this unique selection of images in a
sports broadcast transmission without or in excess of a valid license is
preparing an unauthorized derivative work and is therefore a copyright
infringer. The scenario applies to substantial alterations of the unique
selection of advertisements in a sports broadcast by inserting virtual ad-
238. It is unclear, however, who owns the rights - the broadcasting company, the owner
or tenant of the in-stadium advertisement, or the holder of the television rights.
239. This principle is based on Art. 10, Section 1 Television Without Frontiers Directive;
Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Neue Werbeformen und der Grundsatz der Trennung von Werbung und
Prograrnm, ZErrscHmur FOR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT 672, 1999, available at http://
www.nomos.de/nomos/zeitschr/zumlpdf/zumlO99t.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2000).
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vertisements. If such alterations were allowed, the original copyright
owner would lose control over his or her work and its distribution, tak-
ing away the owner's exclusivity provided by section 106 of the Copy-
right Act. This result is consistent with Congress' underlying intent to
protect the copyright owner from intrusions that violate his or her exclu-
sive right to commercially exploit the work and receive an equivalent
benefit for the creative endeavor. Part of the constitutional guarantee
"to promote the progress of science and useful arts" 240 is to guarantee
the author the right to exploit his achievement financially, by using ad-
vertising and especially if advertising is part of the overall impression. If
the author would not get a financial return for the work, he or she would
be deprived of an incentive to create works.241 Even though the accom-
plishment to insert an advertisement and select the camera angles and
images is not substantial, the adjacent financial interests at stake play an
overwhelmingly important role in the copyright of sports broadcasting.
The Copyright Act protects these interests on a case-by-case basis, inso-
far as some of the original expression is taken by another person, de-
pending on the impact of the alteration on the overall impression of the
work.
In summary, the explicit statutory scheme for compulsory licenses
bars any alteration of the original broadcast, including virtual advertis-
ing. In the cases that do not fall within this scheme, copyright protection
should only extend to alterations by virtual advertising to that part of the
broadcast that meets the requirement of a modicum of intellectual labor
involved in a sport broadcast. An example of this would be if the in-
serted or substituted advertisement distorts the overall impression or the
individual arrangement of advertising in the background of a sports
broadcast.
In cases where this alteration affects the overall impression of the
sports broadcast by changing or even diluting the entire sports perform-
ance, there may even be an unfair competition claim under section
43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act. The analysis of this claim for "false ad-
vertising" focuses even more on consumer protection, while also protect-
ing competitors. This cause of action is, therefore, not only available for
the copyright holder, but also for competing advertisers. Plaintiffs can
allege "false endorsement" or "ambush advertising" under the general
240. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
241. See Brown, No. 98-20736 2000 WL 48992 at *5, n.4 ("... major objective of the
Copyright Act to support and encourage artistic and scientific endeavors"); Zacchini, 433 U.S.
at 576.
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unfair competition. In these scenarios, the public is misled by the misrep-
resentation of the virtual advertiser, who creates the false mental associ-
ation in the viewers mind that he is officially authorized to advertise in
the designated spot. In turn, the authorized advertiser suffers direct fi-
nancial damage, because he did not receive the contractual benefit of
television exposure that he paid for, and/or the goodwill is diminished
and conferred to the virtual advertiser. Both situations equally affect fair
competition if the alteration is substantial. The seriousness of harm is
based on the effect on the consumer and on competing advertisers. In
the worst case scenario, the technology can mislead the public, defame
the persons depicted, deprive the original artists of control over (and
compensation for) subsequent changes to their work, and destroy the
delicate credibility and objectivity of all visual images.242 Generally, un-
authorized substitution using virtual advertising implicates unfair market
behavior to the disadvantage of the original owner of the advertising.
Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act was designed to prevent such
behavior in the advertising market.
Transmitters should be aware of liability under U.S. common law es-
pecially for broadcasts of U.S. sporting events in Europe.243 Virtual ad-
vertisers, who use the technology to insert advertisements into
broadcasts from other countries, are subject to liability under the Lan-
ham Act where the plaintiff has standing, is able to prove all of the sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act elements, and shows an impact on U.S.
commerce.2 1 On the other hand and in light of the increasing number of
international sporting events, broadcast stations, the drafters of market-
ing and broadcasting agreements and courts should be aware of the strict
standards in Europe. Many of these countries prohibit the use of virtual
advertising on the playing field during the game action. Broadcast sta-
tions are often required to give notice to the viewer of the use of virtual
advertisements. The underlying policy seeks to protect the integrity of
242. Raphael Winick, supra note 141, at 155.
243. Steele et al. v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280,286 (1952) ("Congress has the power
to prevent unfair trade practices in foreign commerce by citizens of the United States, al-
though some of the acts are done outside the territorial limits of the United States"). The
United States government has the power to enforce the Lanham Act beyond the territorial
limits of the United States under the following conditions: 1) the acts impact U.S. commerce;
2) the defendant is a citizen of the U.S.; and 3) "application of the act would not interfere with
the laws of a foreign nation."
244. Gordon Breach Sci. Publishers v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 905 F.Supp. 169, 181
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 1991);
McEvilly, supra note 18, at 626; see also, Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633,
641 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956).
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the sport and the consumer from exposure to a stream of undetectable
alterations of reality by blurring the line between program and
advertising.
The American advertising environment does not meet these high
standards of consumer protection in Europe. However, the law provides
sufficient remedy to protect the rights holders. Beyond the point of sub-
stantial alterations by virtual advertising, the existing statutes and princi-
ples of copyright law and the law of unfair competition can effectively
protect and balance the competing needs of copyright owners, advertis-
ers, broadcast stations, players, and the public. Up to this point, only a
defined set of contractual terms or specific legislation for all sorts of digi-
tal alterations in television transmissions can ensure that the conflicting
interests are fairly protected in the digital age.
